Introduction

The announcement that a malaria vaccine (1) has been approved for use in children has been met with huge excitement - and a bit of skepticism. In the main, this is a good story for the mother continent, which is, figures remind us, ground zero for malaria, particularly among children. Malaria remains one of the primary causes of childhood illness and death on this continent, killing over 250 000 children and toddlers annually.  The vaccine could also not have come at a better time as a boost to the inoculation debate that’s raging across the planet because of the global Covid-19 vaccination rollout.  When the World Health Organisation (WHO) recommended the widespread use of the malaria vaccine known as RTS,S, its head, Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, described this as a long awaited “breakthrough”.  He said: “This is a historic moment. The long-awaited malaria vaccine for children is a breakthrough for science, child health and malaria control. Using this vaccine on top of existing tools to prevent malaria could save tens of thousands of young lives each year.”   Amid the jubilation, though, questions are being asked about why it took so long to reach this point. Dr Matshidiso Moeti, the regional director of the WHO in Africa, said: “For centuries, malaria has stalked sub-Saharan Africa, causing immense personal suffering. We have long hoped for an effective malaria vaccine and now for the first time ever, we have such a vaccine recommended for widespread use. Today’s recommendation offers a glimmer of hope for the continent which shoulders the heaviest burden of the disease, and we expect many more African children to be protected from malaria and grow into healthy adults.”   The deadly parasite malaria comes in the main via blood sucking mosquito bites; it destroys white blood cells, reproducing itself as it does so. A multi-pronged approach has been used over the years to prevent the disease from spreading. Bed-nets that protect children from being bitten while they are asleep, and insecticides designed to kill mosquitoes, are among the main prevention strategies.  Despite these efforts, malaria cases remain alarmingly high. WHO stats report 229 million cases annually around the globe – 94% of those in Africa and a worldwide 409 000 death toll per year.

 

The RTS,S vaccine targets Plasmodium falciparum, the deadliest of all malaria-causing parasites (2) and the most prevalent in Africa. The WHO says the RTS,S vaccine will help 4 in 10 cases of malaria and 3 out of 10 in severe cases.  Africans can be proud because the RTS,S vaccine is a result of more than 30 years of research and development by the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) as well as African research centres. The health ministries of Ghana, Kenya and Malawi, where 2,3 million doses have been administered, produced pilot data on the drug’s feasibility, safety and implementation. This was a global collaborative effort by the Vaccine Alliance, Unitaid, Gavi, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation provided catalytic funding at the critical late development stage between 2011 and 2015.  WHO will lead the implementation programme together with international partners UNICEF, GSK and the three pilot in-country coordinators. The pharmaceutical giant has already donated more than 10 million doses.  This is all good news, at first glance. But, as we have seen in recent months with Covid-19, the RTS,S rollout comes with its own set of complexities.

Pressure on health systems and budgets?

For instance, for the malaria vaccine to be deemed effective, it requires four doses (3). The first three doses need to be administered a month apart (when babies are 5, 6 and 7 months old); the fourth, a booster, is given at 18 months. This will certainly stretch African countries’ already fragile health systems infrastructure.  And some are already pointed to constrained health budgets, worried that these will make such an extensive rollout difficult.  At a potential cost of about $5 per dose, some researchers suggest the vaccine rollout, including its distribution, would cost around $325 million to administer each year across ten African countries with a high incidence of malaria. They point out that in some of these countries, other malaria measures have faltered because of a lack of support.  A 2019 study concluded that around $630 million would be needed per annum to vaccinate 41 endemic countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 

What are African researchers saying?

At Mali’s university of Bamako, malaria researcher Alassane Dicko said this about a discussion with the country’s health minister soon after the WHO’s announcement regarding the use of RTS,S: “I told her we need to push as a country, at the highest levels of our government, to make this vaccine available at an affordable cost as soon as possible,” he said.  But not all the continent’s researchers are convinced.  Badara Cisse, a researcher from the Institute for Health Research and Epidemiological Surveillance and Training in Senegal’s capital Dakar, expressed his concerns: “I respect the researchers involved with this massive effort, but the reality is that so much money has been poured into this vaccine, even when the results from studies are disappointing.”  Also, in Cisse’s corner is a Ugandan epidemiologist at the Malaria Consortium in London, James Tibenderana. He said that the RTS,S vaccine could be impactful in some regions, but stressed the need for extensive mass communication campaigns, to prevent misinformation (4)from hindering the rollout.  “People will wonder why a 30-year-old, partially effective vaccine is suddenly being introduced during a pandemic…. and targeted only at Africans.”  Tibenderana warned: “The misinformation around Covid-19 vaccines should teach us that we can’t take community trust for granted.”  However, he did acknowledge that in light of the devastation caused by Covid-19, “it’s uplifting to see some positive news”.  Dr. Dorcas Wilson (5), a paediatric neurologist based in Johannesburg, South Africa, has seen children, mostly younger than five, suffering from cerebral malaria. She told Africa Asia Dialogues it is imperative that critical care reaches those who need it the most in the shortest possible time frames. That may mean vaccines need to be produced locally here in Africa.  She said: “We welcome this breakthrough but in order for it to have a high impact on the ground, where most of these children are presenting in under-resourced hospitals, we may reach a stage, quite like the Covid-19 vaccine now being produced locally in Africa, also for the malaria vaccine production line to get closer to the people it is meant to serve.”

Conclusion

Fit for all?

The WHO itself has been criticised for taking a “one size fits all” approach.  In a blog, the Center for Global Development (CGD) (6) said the WHO “should avoid issuing a sweeping global recommendation and encourage instead national and subnational assessments to inform decision-making processes”.  “In short, any WHO policy recommendation concerning the implementation of new interventions for the prevention and treatment of malaria should consider value for money and sustainable financing as well as encourage countries to still conduct their own assessments and decide for themselves what is best for their populations. The best way to make progress is with firm, locally led steps,” the independent research and analysis centre added.

Better days ahead

Having suffered from the deadly disease myself, when I was bitten by a determined mosquito in South Sudan (pre-secession) and ended up in hospital for a couple of weeks with high fever and debilitating body aches, I can safely say this is a step in the right direction. However, as outlined above, there are many hurdles to overcome even at this euphoric moment. There are other vaccines that are still in pilot stage, like the Oxford vaccine (7) which is being piloted in Burkina Faso. Initial reports said it has a 73% efficacy, but a lot more work still needs to be done.

References

1. https://www.who.int/news/item/06-10-2021-who-recommends-groundbreaking-malaria-vaccine-for-children-at-risk

2. https://cgdev.org/blog/malaria-vaccine-WHO-three-key-considerations-wider-use

3. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-58810551

4. https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cvenzmgylxwt/malaria

5. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02755-5

6. https://www.malariavaccine.org/

7. https://www.medicalnetwork.co.za/Profile/39457/Dr-Dorcas-Wilson

 

About the Author

Milton Nkosi Milton Nkosi is a chairman of MMN International Consulting, specialising in media, advisory and reputation. He is the former  BBC News Africa Bureaux Chief and South Asia Bureaux Editor. He served as a trustee on the board of Warwick University's Warwick in Africa Programme.

Abstract

The ever-expanding influence of the internet on human social interaction is fraught with risks. China, where internet access is rapidly becoming ubiquitous, is seeing some of these risks evolve into real-world problems. By the end of 2020, China recorded 989 million internet users; that was up by 85.4 million from March 2020, according to the China Internet Network Information Center (1). The figures are especially high for young people putang ina.

These young people are frequent users of social media applications like WeChat (WhatsApp), Sina Weibo (Twitter) and Douyin (TikTok). There, they communicate and interact with each other. This avid use of various social platforms incites somewhat of an extreme and obsessive subculture among Chinese youth: an obsession with pop culture figures that takes “fandom” to toxic, time consuming and, at times, dangerous extremes. This report will discuss toxic fan culture, the reasons behind it and, finally, will highlight some examples.

Introduction

We’ve all heard about the horrors of internet predators, waiting in the shadows to target the vulnerable. But little has been discussed about how extreme consumption of and attachment to the internet can bring negative consequences for its users. This article aims to explore the obsessive social media culture among China’s youth. It will initially outline some of the reasons that people are driven towards virtual relationships, including background about Chinese social media, general societal structure and the effects of the Covid-19 virus on internet use. The article will then flow into the existence, understanding and effects of para-social relationships through the lens of live streams (the largest and fastest-growing social media phenomenon) and pop sensations. Finally, the article will conclude by exploring the extreme nature of fandoms, drawing on several examples including Kris Wu, super fans, and how the government has responded in these cases.

Reasons young people are drawn to virtual relationships

The internet, initially, was a tool for communication, entertainment and education.   However, by the turn of the century, and over the last decade especially, it has been integrated into every aspect of contemporary life. The internet is the most popular medium for communication and therefore the most popular medium for building and exerting social, economic and political influence. The internet, following the Covid-19 virus outbreak, has become an auxiliary tool for education, namely, for online learning, online teaching, group discussions and academic communication (2). The internet has also, because of both its rapid development and the gradual reform of the Chinese political landscape, become one of the main ways to evaluate the government’s performance (3). It has also become the overarching way to consolidate and create relationships.

For us to understand the current youth social media climate, we must first journey to the beginning. The Chinese one-child policy did more than curb the birth rate. It introduced a sense of social isolation, especially among young people. And these young people, many of them born in the 1990s, have grown up in a world very different to the one occupied and experienced by their parents. As the older generation participated in China’s urbanisation and economic growth, cities transformed from traditionally larger Chinese families to one-child households (4). Subsequently, family dynamics changed. In more recent years, it has been argued, younger generations feel less personally connected to relatives, friends or neighbours. (5).

But they are far more tech-savvy and, so, connected in a different way. From an early age, they were already familiar with the use of cellphones, messaging tools and search engines. Unfortunately, though, this has created a preference for virtual rather than physical interactions. Of the long list of day-to-day priorities for the youth in China, human social interaction is not included (6). Many millennials (aged 24-39) and Gen Zs (18-23) are reported to have experienced some social phobias (7). Among 2532 participants of a research study by VCG, only 69 said they had no problem with human interaction; 97% of participants said they avoided all social activities (8). Young people are living in their bubbles with only a slight connection to the real world. Herein lies the problematic truth: most people appreciate the convenience of technology, but at the expense of a chance to understand the workings of physical human communication (9).

Chinese work culture – which prizes hard work and diligence - does little to defuse the situation. China’s general economic structure is incredibly complex; the large gaps between the rich and the poor and the small jump from middle class to lower class fuels much of Chinese work culture. If a person does not work hard to succeed, most fear they could slip into a lower class. As a result, in recent years, the Chinese worker runs at a “9-9-6” pace: work from 9 AM to 9 PM, six days a week with, most often, no extra pay (10).

This leaves little room for human socialisation or physical interaction. People are forced to socialise in the digital sphere. For the youth, pressures are no different. As a result of the 1-child policy, the family framework is inverted (11). There is great pressure on children to succeed so they can support their parents and grandparents. The youth find that online interactions may be their only reprieve (12).

 

The draw to live streams

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has forced everyone online – and made absolute isolation almost mandatory. For the youth, live streams and chat rooms appear to be at the forefront of social interaction opportunities (13). In 2005, following the repurposing of public video service YY, the live stream was born. Today, the industry is said to be worth over $5 billion (14). Live streams are performances by usually female dancers or singers on webcams. Streamers are paid through a rewards-based system. Viewers, live in-stream, gift the streamer; this can thereafter be exchanged for cash. This is a break from the traditional notion of pay-per-view and it has proved so popular that it’s been adopted by mainstream services such as Facebook Live and Periscope (15).

“Viewers who have difficulty or are reluctant to integrate into traditional social settings are provided with a new means of seeking comfort, use and protection” (Lin, 2017:2). Even more still, live-streams holds the appeal of intimacy and community, especially for those suffering from the societal pressures of achievement and work. 70% of live-stream users are under the age of 30, of those, 74% are male (16). Live stream statistics go further in observing that viewership peaks during lunch breaks and after work or school hours. Live streams detract from the loneliness most of the youth feel. Live comment and gift visualisation encourages immediate responses from streamers which, in turn, creates a more personal and intimate relationship between the streamer and the viewer (17).

Quite similar to the rise to stardom for some YouTubers, live streaming has breathed new life into an unknown dimension of Chinese entertainment and celebrity culture. However, streamers teeter on a very thin line. Mainstream modern celebrities hold somewhat of an aloof status. There is no ultra-interactive intimacy between the fan and celebrity; for streamers, however, this is very different. Streamers, although attaining wealth proportionate to mainstream celebrities, lack the security of persona. Simply put, the mainstream general public might not know or have built an actual interactive relationship with a celebrity, let alone a monetary one. Mainstream celebrities boast a type of wall between themselves and the general public. Streamers, on the other hand, have just as much, if not more recognition than mainstream celebrities, but without the protection of the anonymity associated with playing a character or role.

Streamers have garnered their celebrity status through thousands of live interactions with their fans. Fans, in turn, feel the streamer is familiar to them and can develop a personal connection. Viewers, to put it bluntly, feel as if they know the streamer; they are led to believe that this is an actual relationship. But it is actually a para-social relationship, defined as one-sided relationships in which a person extends their time, energy and interest into another party while the other party is completely unaware of their existence (18). These sorts of fan connections have spilled over into other realms of celebrity, such as pop stardom.

Fandoms

China is amid a grand social phenomenon, fandoms. Fandoms, as the name suggests, are fan kingdoms. Thousands of fandoms exist because of people’s love for celebrities. The existence of fandoms encapsulates the notion of a para-social relationship. The only difference is that in China, fandoms have turned into a very public, somewhat disturbing obsession (19). The conversation of fandoms became prominent when, in 2018, Canadian Chinese pop rapper, Kris Wu, beat Ariana Grande and Lady Gaga for the top streaming spot on iTunes. It was later discovered that Wu’s fans downloaded and purchased the songs multiple times (20). They had manipulated the system.  Fandoms were brought into the spotlight when, on Sina Weibo, Chinese pop singer Cai Xukun was retweeted 100 million times. However, the platform only has 130 million users: apparently a third of users re-posted the star (21). An investigation by China Central Television (CCTV) (22) found that extremely popular idols on social media were paying for their coverage and celebrity.

It is no secret that at times, mainstream popular social media celebrities have been known to buy their engagement; namely, their followers, likes and comments. In China, however, social media engagement is not simply bought but allied with a group of far more organised and dedicated super fans.

A deeper delve into the world of fandoms, fan pages and chat rooms revealed a rather sinister and daunting aspect of para-social relationships. Fan clubs and fan pages are incredibly organised, to the point of ultra-infatuation and obsession. Interviews by the Global Times revealed the inner workings of fandoms (23). The main goal of fandoms is to promote idols. Idols are young Asian pop stars with hundreds of thousands, if not millions of young fans. The promotion of idols, as previously mentioned, is highly organised. Fans are strictly regulated and given different tasks such as voting, running social pages and raising funds. In past years, fans of Karry Wang, a member of boy-band group TFBoys, splashed a month-long birthday poster that covered an elevated train (24). Additionally, Sina Entertainment quoted South Korean media as saying that in 2018, fans of the K-pop group Wanna One bought first-class plane tickets just to meet the group (25). After taking photos they were asked to leave and were escorted off the plane. The plane was delayed for one hour.

Government ramifications

At the Two Sessions Meetings in May, a delegate of the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislature, made a plea to the government and the Chinese public at large (26). The delegate mentioned some of the mounting discontent associated with the existence and rampant interaction of extreme fandoms and super fans. Fears of widespread doxing, bullying and harassment were at the forefront of her address (27). Doxing involves revealing identifying information about someone online, such as a home address, phone number, work location or even financial situation. Due to the toxic and competitive nature of fan clubs, doxing and other negative online behaviours have been rampant. In an article by Sup China, fan clubs are said to continuously compete and interact with one another for their idol to reach the top spots (28). Fan clubs personally target rival members to weaken the ‘strength’ and standing of rival idols. Young middle school students, the article goes on to say, spend more than five hours a day on fan sites, begging the question of healthy online/offline relationships (29).

Not all young social media users in China are part of extreme fandoms. However, the phenomenon does point to the dangers of consistent social media exposure. The extreme nature of toxic fan culture has gone as far as to garner attention from the Chinese government. Following a statement from the Cyberspace Administration of China in June, detailing the corruption of the “pure and healthy online ecosystem” of the internet, the implications of fandom culture were called into question (30). Extreme fandom culture is running rampant. The administration has called for a social media crackdown, with the removal of 4000 social media accounts, the deletion of 150 000 harmful posts and the closure of 39 apps (31). The administration also mentioned that fandom culture has and will continue to negatively affect the physical and social well-being of China’s youth if it is not contained and controlled.

Conclusion

China’s youth are in the grips of a malevolent wave of social media culture. The internet has brought a multitude of modern technological advances and conveniences. But, at the same time, it has formed new toxic cultures and negative internet behaviours. The internet, a tool for education, entertainment and communication, has also in some cases replaced human interaction. Aspects of the internet such as live streams and the proliferation of pop stars have created a new sub-genre to the Chinese entertainment sphere. Live streams and the die-hard loyalty of super-fans, fan club, fandoms, and fan pages show the unyielding existence of para-social relationships. These relationships have gone as far as necessitating government interaction. In closing, China’s youth social media culture is incredibly toxic.

• Cheng, E. 2021. China says it now has nearly 1 billion internet users. CNBC (online). Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/04/china-says-it-now-has-nearly-1-billion-internet-users.html (Accessed: 20 September 2021).

• Ibid, 1

• France 24. 2021. China clamps down on pop culture in bid to ‘control’ youth. France 24. Available at:

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210929-china-clamps-down-on-pop-culture-in-bid-to-control-youth (Accessed: 20 September 2021).

• Tang, L., Omar, S.Z., Bolong, J. and Mohd Zawawi, J.W., 2021. Social Media Use Among Young People in China: A Systematic Literature Review. SAGE Open. Available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/21582440211016421. (Accessed: 20 September 2021).

• Ibid, 4

• Ibid, 4

• Ran, B. 2020. Go social or go solo? Social media is a blend for young Chinese. CGTN (online). Available at:

https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-08-30/Social-or-solo-What-social-engagement-looks-like-for-young-Chinese-Tn0bl3LJPq/index.html .( Accessed : 20 September 2021).

• Ibid, 7

• Ibid, 7

• Ibid, 7

• Schwartz, N. 2021. Work culture in China: The 996 working hour system. Xinergy Global. Available at:

https://www.xinergy.global/work-culture-in-china/, (Accessed : 20 September 2021).

• Hancock, T., Xueqiao, W. 2019. Overdoing it: The cost of China’s long-hours culture. Financial Times. Available at:

https://www.ft.com/content/d5f01f68-9cbc-11e8-88de-49c908b1f264, (Accessed :20 September 2021).

• Fakude, Q. 2021. What does the three-child policy mean for women empowerment in China? Afrasid. Available at: http://www.afrasid.org/index.php/publications/articles-2/85-what-does-the-three-child-policy-mean-for-women-s-empowerment-in-china. (Accessed: 22 September 2021).

• Ibid, 7

• Ibid, 7

• Lin, J. and Lu, Z., 2017. The rise and proliferation of live-streaming in China: Insights and lessons. In International conference on human-computer interaction(pp. 632-637). Springer, Cham. Available at:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317172185_The_Rise_and_Proliferation_of_Live-Streaming_in_China_Insights_and_Lessons , (Accessed : 20 September 2021).

• Ibid, 16

• Ibid, 16

• Ibid, 16

• Ibid, 16

• Find a psychologist. 2021. Parasocial relationships: The nature of celebrity fascinations. National Register of Health Service Psychologists. Available at:

https://www.findapsychologist.org/parasocial-relationships-the-nature-of-celebrity-fascinations/  (Accessed: 22 September 2021).

• Chow, Y. 2021. Explainer: What is the reasoning behind China’s crackdown on ‘toxic’ fandom culture, and how are people reacting? YP (online). Available at:

https://www.scmp.com/yp/discover/news/asia/article/3147895/explainer-what-reasoning-behind-chinas-crackdown-toxic-fandom , (Accessed : 20 September 2021).

• Ibid, 22

• Ibid, 22

• Ibid, 22

• Jie, S. 2019. Highly organized and well-trained fandom in China becomes industry. Global Times (online). Available at:

https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1141134.shtml . (Accessed: 20 September 2021).

• Ibid, 26

• Ibid, 26

• Ibid, 3

• Yip, W. 2021. China targets obsessive teenage fans in new internet cleanup campaign. BBC News. Available at:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58459318,  (Accessed: 22 September 2021).

• Ibid, 22

• Ibid, 22

• Ibid, 22

• Ibid, 5

 

About the author

Qhawelazo Ayesha Fakude holds a Bachelor of Social Science from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She majored in politics and governance, anthropology and sociology.

 

Abstract

As a central and powerful member of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey has since the Ottoman period of the late 19th century always maintained limited cultural, political, and economic ties with the prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) South Africa. The Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s Republic of Turkey established in 1923, turned its attention to the West, and modern Turkey’s secular ruling elites and foreign policymakers largely neglected Asia and Africa. Turkey was neither among those countries who proactively supported the African National Congress’ (ANC) struggle against the Apartheid regime, and had instead established strong trade relations with the apartheid government, especially in the military field, during the white minority regime’s last years. Turkey’s 1998 “Opening to Africa Action Plan” was Turkey’s first solid Africa policy that laid the cornerstone for the relation between the two countries. Although Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party significantly improved political and economic relations with South Africa since 2002, Turkey’s currently stagnant economy remains a major hindrance to Erdogan’s success in South Africa. Turkish mobile power station Karpowership’s Record South Africa deal estimated at $15 Billion, is the biggest gain to come of the AKP’s lobbying efforts with the ANC. This research paper explores how Turkey’s high trade volume with South Africa will shape the political and diplomatic climate between these regional powers.

Introduction

Turkey’s religious, cultural, political, and economic relations with South Africa began in the late 19th Century. Ottoman-Kurdish Scholar Abu-Bakr Effendi who settled in Cape Town in 1862 played a significant role in establishing a historical relationship between the two states.  Ottoman consulates also actively worked in South Africa from 1861 to 1923 until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, however, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkish Republic and his successor Ismet Inonu pursued strict Western orientation until 1950, as a result, Turkey largely ignored Asia and Africa. The new Turkish Republic’s lack of resources also prevented it from reaching Sub-Saharan Africa. The Turkish state began its diplomatic relations with important African countries by opening consulates and embassies in Nigeria in 1956, and Ghana in 1957, Senegal in 1962, and Kenya in 1968. The state also established trade relations with Apartheid South Africa in 1989. The two countries upgraded their diplomatic relations to an ambassadorial level in 1991. (1)  

South Africa’s Second President Thabo Mbeki followed a multidimensional foreign policy by developing diplomatic and trade relations with African countries as well as strategic actors in global politics including Turkey. The then Deputy President Jacob Zuma’s visit to Turkey in 2003 as well as the then Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to South Africa with a large Turkish business delegation improved relations between the two states. Erdogan signed Double Taxation, the Customs Agreement, and the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement with South Africa. Erdogan signed a joint declaration with South Africa during his second official visit to Pretoria on 3-5 October in 2011.

Since Erdogan came to power in 2003, Turkey’s business, aid, diplomatic, cultural, and military activities in Africa soared. Erdogan’s Turkey increased its embassies from a dozen in 2009 to 43 today. Construction, steel and cement, textiles, household goods, and electronic devices are among Turkey’s main trade and investment sectors while Ankara’s total investment in the continent stands at $6.5bn today. South Africa is today Turkey’s biggest economic partner in sub-Saharan Africa, with bilateral trade of an estimated $1.3bn in 2019, Turkey’s Ambassador to South Africa Elif Ulgen Comoglu confirmed.  Turkish Airlines flies to 51 destinations in 33 African countries, 26 of them in sub-Saharan Africa. Ulgen told African Businesses that South African tourism to Turkey surged from 15,000 arrivals in 2016 to 79,000 in 2019. (2) Erdogan made more official trips to Africa than any other non-African head of state and trade between Turkey and Africa has accelerated from $5.5bn in 2003 to more than $26bn today during his rule. 

The success of the Turkish Karpowership’s 15 billion energy deal with South Africa’s Eskom amid the country’s power crises, is bound to have a great impact on the relation between the two states. Karpowership, a subsidiary of Turkey’s Karadeniz Energy Group, owns the world's only floating power plant fleets generate power from heavy fuel oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG) and feed power directly into national grids. The company’s 25 powerships have been completed reaching 4,100 MW installed capacity and Powerships have already been supplying 60% of Gambia, 26% of Ghana, 100% of Guinea Bissau, 10% of Guinea, 10% of Mozambique, 15% of Senegal, 80% of Sierra Leone, 10% of Sudan and 16% of Zambia’s energy needs. (3)

Two Regional Powers: What are the drivers of South Africa-Turkey rapprochement?

South Africa and Turkey focused on domestic challenges such as job creation, poverty, and inequalities during the 1990s. Thanks to their growing economies and political awareness, both regional powers have been following active and dynamic foreign policy since 2000. South Africa is the leading economy in the continent and plays an active role in the African Union, thus Turkey sees Pretoria as a regional partner in the continent as Turkey pursues a very active Africa policy. South Africa fully supports the AU’s launch of an envisaged Continental Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). South Africa is also the only African member of G-20 thereby amplifying Africa’s voice globally. South African Minister of Trade and Industry, Dr. Rob Davis, signed the agreement establishing the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) in a meeting held in Kampala, Uganda, On 7 July 2017. Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC) trade ministers, and officials from the Common Market were ready at the meeting. South Africa’s roles in the 15-state Southern African Development Community (SADC) which is one of the AU's most dynamic Regional Economic Communities (RECs) makes relations with the country more strategic for Turkey’s Africa economic opening. (4)  

Since becoming a BRICS member in 2011, South Africa has been playing more active role in Africa and in the international system. Two major Brics’ members, Russia and China have for thousands of years had a very complex relationship with Turkey. Turkey shares common ethnic-linguistic roots with Central Asian Turkic states, who were under Soviet Rule for 70 years, and the people of China’s Xinjiang region. Then-Prime Minister Erdoğan who had grown weary of the EU membership process, stated: “Fifty years of experience is not easy. Allow us into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and save us from this trouble.” During a conversation with Russia's President Vladimir in Strelna near St. Petersburg in November 2013. (5) China is the founding and leading member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China had become one of Turkey's three major trading partners, along with Germany and Russia while Turkey remains deeply interested in China’s New Silk Roads project. Thus, Turkey’s historical, cultural and economic relations with Moscow and Beijing, makes South Africa’s BRICS membership more important for Ankara. Turkish leader Erdogan is neither following a Western-oriented foreign policy nor pushing for Turkey’s European Membership since early 2010. Instead, Erdogan has made a great deal of effort toward developing relationships with Asian and African countries. Turkey has recently started defining itself as an “Afro-Eurasian” state. On 25-27 July 2018, Erdogan joined the BRICS Summit as head of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the body has 57 Muslim State members. Some Turkish sources believe that Erdogan’s BRICS participation occurred after an invitation from Russian President Putin. During his BRICS visit, President Erdoğan held meetings with President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China, and President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation. Erdogan appeared to have utilized the Summit entirely and to the greatest degree as he met with President Cyril Ramaphosa of the Republic of South Africa, President Joao Lourenco of Angola, and President Faure Gnassingbe of Togo during the summit. Erdogan also addressed the Muslim community of South Africa and took the opportunity to meet with prominent business people in South Africa.

Although South Africa doesn’t regard Turkey as a regional partner in the Middle East and Balkan region as Turkey sees South Africa as a regional partner in Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey’s strategic position in the Middle East and recently in the Horn of Africa takes growing attention from South Africa. Turkey’s leading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa is South Africa, as of 40% of Ankara’s business in the region is with South Africa. Ankara has enhanced its presence in the Horn of Africa as Turkey has set up its biggest overseas military base in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. Turkish firms operate Mogadishu’s seaport and airport.  The Horn of Africa is a very strategic region due to its huge population. Turkey’s strong economic and military relations with Ethiopia, where the African Union headquarters is located, make Turkey an, even more, appailing country for African Union members and South Africa.

The issue of Palestine is one of the key matters uniting Turkey and South Africa in the Middle East politics. Ankara and Pretoria share a similar approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict following the Mavi Marmara incident, in which the Israeli commandos raided the ship during its attempt to break Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip, killing 9 Turkish soldiers and one Turkish-American. Following the flotilla raid, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv and South Africa’s former President Thabo Mbeki made a harsh statement against Israel in 2010: “Whatever it (Israel) does, it will never face the danger of international isolation especially by the major world powers, and will always ensure that regardless of the rhetoric, its interest and aspirations will always occupy the first place in the strategic considerations of the major world powers, with these of the Palestinians being dealt with as a peripheral irritation.” Mbeki also criticised Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of violating the 1967 borders and undermining the idea of “two-state solution”. Both Former President Mbeki, as well as Former President Jacob Zuma, shared similar sentiments toward the Palestinian issue as Erdogan. In the face of Western criticism, Erdogan met Hamas’ leader Khaled Masha’al in Ankara in February 2016, and Jacob Zuma, as a President of South Africa hosted Masha’al in Johannesburg in October 2015. South Africa also recalled its ambassador to Israel after at least 52 Palestinians were killed in clashes with Israeli forces during protests over the United States moving its embassy to Jerusalem in May 2018 and then South African International Relations Minister Lindiwe Sisulu told a journalist in Johannesburg in April 2019 that South Africa has downgraded its embassy in Tel Aviv. Both South Africa as well as Turkey supported Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear power in 2005. “South Africa backs Iran’s stance on the right of a country to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes” Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad said in July 2005.

What are the diplomatic and political trappings of Turkey- South Africa relations?

Turkey’s increasing involvement in African conflicts, the Cyprus issue, the ANC’s support for PKK and the Gulen Movement’s presence in South Africa as well as Pretoria’s unwillingness to sign the Free Trade Agreement with Ankara are some major setbacks for the Turkey- South Africa relation.

Erdogan’s humanitarian and business-oriented Africa policy turned into military involvement in the continent. Sunday Times reported last year that South African President Cyril Ramaphosa urged Turkey’s President Erdogan to exercise restraint and not deploy any troops to the war-torn North African country. The Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor also talked to her Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu – also regarding this issue. Turkish military cargo planes, carrying Covid-19 medical aid to South Africa, landed in Cape Town in May 2020 and returned backed to Turkey with military equipment. South Africa’s National Conventional Arms Control Committee’s approval of the export of military hardware purchased from Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM), to Turkey when the Turkish military is at war, both in Libya and in Syria, was criticised in news articles published in South Africa’s Daily Maverick and Independent media. Following the arms export to Turkey, NCACC was questioned by the South African Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence about reports that military hardware had been exported to Turkey in May 2020, and the possibility that these might end up in Libya. South African Minister Mthembu said the sale and use of military weapons are guided by international protocol, and also by South African regulations that military hardware is not to be sold to countries involved in conflicts. Mthembu warned (Turkey) that “countries that we interact with in good faith should not do anything that has not been agreed on”. (6)

The Cyprus issue is an ongoing dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The British Empire occupied the strategic Mediterranean Island from Ottoman Empire in 1878 and, Cyprus was unilaterally annexed by Great Britain in 1914 when the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War. Few days after the 1974 Cypriot coup d'état, initiated by the Greek military junta, the Turkish military takeover of Northern Cyprus, and the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus has controlled the southern two-thirds of the island. The Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) recognized only by Turkey, has ruled the northern third. South Africa has a considerable Greek and Greek Cypriot population that have protested Turkey’s Cyprus intervention and are lobbying against the Turkish state.

The Ruling ANC’s close relationship with senior leaders of the outlawed Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) is one of the major setbacks and a cause of the deteriorating relationship between Ankara and Pretoria. The PKK has been fighting against Turkey for an independent or autonomous Kurdistan in Turkey since 1984. The armed conflict between PKK and Turkish forces has led to the loss of more than 50 thousand lives since the beginning of the conflict. South Africa’s former Ambassador to Turkey, Tom Wheeler mentioned that DIRCO officials met from time to time with the representatives of PKK and that the ANC and previously PKK representatives abroad had developed personal connections. 

South Africa’s freedom icon and first president of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela’s support for PKK was a major point of conflict between the two countries. The capture of the PKK leader in Kenya in 1999, and the initial death sentence imposed on him, which was commuted in life imprisonment in 2002, disrupted Turkey’s developing relations with South Africa.

Nelson Mandela rejected Turkey’s prestigious Ataturk Peace Award in 1991 as a liberation movement leader because of Turkey’s human rights violations. When Mandela came to power in 1994, he reduced the number of its embassies in the world including Turkey as the Ankara government had once formed a strong relationship with the apartheid South Africa. The Mandela government stopped selling arms to Turkey and suspended all military agreements.

Erdogan blames Fethullah Gulen, spiritual leader of the Hizmet Movement, for the failed 15 July 2016 Coup attempt, since then, Erdogan’s AKP government treats the Gulen Movement as the ultimate enemy of the state. Erdogan’s AKP dismissed over 150 000 Hizmet followers from their jobs, and without trial arrested around 100 000 since the coup attempt. (7) The Erdogan government used to collaborate with the Gulen Movement in its African activities. AKP’s many senior members and deputies including Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and Minister of Development Cevdet Yilmaz visited Hizmet Movement education institutions in Johannesburg while the Minister of Economic Affairs Zafer Caglayan closely collaborated with Gulen Movement affiliated business association to organize Turkey’s business summits in South Africa during 2000s. Erdogan himself met several Gulen Movement members during his visits to South Africa before 2016. The Erdogan government no longer seeks any help from the Gulen Movement in their activities in Africa but instead has been requesting their extradition from African governments including South Africa. Gulen Movement affiliated schools have achieved top matric results in South Africa and many ANC leaders still appreciate the educational and community-based activities and efforts of the movement and continue engaging with members of the movement despite Turkey’s propaganda against the Gulen Movement disseminated through the Turkish Embassy and Ankara funded Maarif Foundation and Yunus Emre Foundation. The Gulen Movement began education and aid activities in Africa long before Erdogan’s Africa adventure. Erdogan’s hunt for Gulen Movement members who worked as Turkey’s soft powers since late the 1990, has been unsuccessful in South Africa, a country with a strong constitution that protects human rights.

South African media has become critical of Erdogan’s post-coup purge in Turkey and his hunt for Hizmet followers in South Africa. “Our government is well aware of Erdogan’s pronouncements that “no country in the world will be safe for Gulen members they have no right to life”. It is not in Zuma or the ANC’s political culture to capitulate to these demands.” Independent’s Group Foreing Editor Shannon Ebrahim criticised. (8)

Thembisa Fakude, from Al-Jazeera Center for Studies analysed that The Hizmet Movement has played an important role introducing and promoting Turkey in Southern and Sub-Saharan Africa and Erdogan’s recent anti-Hizmet policy will risk Turkey’s achievement in the region as the Hizmet Movement is generally popular in Southern Africa. (9)

An additional complication in Turkey and South Africa’s relationship is the Free Trade Agreement with Turkey. Despite Ankara’s tireless effort, Pretoria has not signed the agreement yet. South Africa doesn’t want Turkish goods to destroy its local manufacturing such as textile, and home appliances. Turkey and South Africa are competing in the continent and Turkish GSM Operator Turkcell’s court war with MTN is the best business competition between the two countries. Turkish mobile operator Turkell filed a damage claim of 4.2 billion Dollars against MTN in 2013 in the South Gauteng high court claiming that it had first won in 2004 to operate Iran’s first cell phone company but later MTN paid bribes and other inducements to secure the Irancell contract.

Conclusion 

The Turkish mobile power station Karpowership’s record deal with South Africa is bound to have a considerable impact either negative or positive on the political and diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Istanbul-based company promises to provide cheap electricity to South Africa, as the country works hard toward reducing its dependence on coal while failing to find solutions to frequent power blackouts.

Karpowerships’ 20-year contract with Eskom under “the Risk Mitigation Independent Producer Procurement Programme” will certainly encourage more Turkish business investment in South Africa. Kargopowership’s Managing director Zeynep Harezi states that the Turkish firm tries to stay completely above all politics, endeavouring only to provide low-cost and reliable electricity during these uncertain times. However, one may argue that the Turkish government has utilized to its favour this giant energy contract to influence the ANC government against Gulen Movement members in the country. On the other hand, there is controversy surrounding Karpowership’s deal with Eskom as it is thought that this may limit Erdogan’s influence in South Africa. The South African media has questioned the local content exemption granted to Karpowership, as it was flagged as an issue of “extreme concern” by the Richards Bay Clean Air Association company. (10)

Although Turkey’s investment has increased in South Africa and the country has attracted attention as a strategic country in the Middle East as well as for its involvement in the Horn of Africa, Turkey’s worsening human right situation has gained a great deal of criticism from the South African media and civil society.

South Africa’s large Greek and Greek Cypriot population has also negatively influenced South Africa’s approach to Turkey. PKK and Pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party leaders who visited South Africa several times still have strong contact with the ruling ANC government. The Erdogan government failed to convince Western states as well as a Democratic South Africa that the Gulen Movement was behind the coup. South Africa remans a profitable investment destination in the region but Erdogan’s influence on the ANC government will be very limited despite an increasing trade volume.

References

1) Dergipark, “Turkey and South Africa Relations: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Turk Cooperation and Coordination Agency, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/422192, 2017, P.15

2) African Business, Erdogan’s ambition drives Turkey’s Africa surge, https://african.business/2021/03/trade-investment/erdogans-ambition-drives-turkeys-africa-surge,17 March 2021, 

3) Karadeniz Holding, http://www.karadenizholding.com/en/group-companies/powership, 2017

4) Dirco, South Africa plays an active role in the AU,  http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2017/au0711.htm, 11 July 2017

5) Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish PM Erdoğan to Putin: Take us to Shanghai, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-to-putin-take-us-to-shanghai-58348, 22 November 2013

6) Parliament.gov.za, Ncacc To Report Back To The Joint Commıttee On Defence Regardıng Export Of Military Hardware To Turkey, https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/ncacc-report-back-joint-committee-defence-regarding-export-military-hardware-turkey,  25 June 2020 

7) Turkey Purge, https://turkeypurge.com/, 4 March 2019

8) IOL, South Africa is not a hunting ground, https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/south-africa-is-not-a-hunting-ground-9226874, 19 May 2017

9) AL Jazeera Center for Studies, The Future of Turkish Engagement in Africa: The Question of Hizmet, https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/11/future-turkish-engagement-africa-question-hizmet-161113082540850.html, 13 November 2016

10) Daily Maverick, Floating gas ‘powerships’ plan gets another free pass from South African government, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-03-14-floating-gas-powerships-plan-gets-another-free-pass-from-south-african-government/, 14 March 2021

Introduction

Historically, transportation of most exports and imports from Europe to the East and vice versa had to go through a long and expensive route pass the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. The establishment of the Suez Canal on 17 November 1869 cut the distance and time of transportation of exports and imports tremendously. The Suez Canal also increased the utilization of the Red Sea making it one of the most competed waters in the world. There are six countries bordering the Red Sea namely; Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. The increased business along the Red Sea also drew attention to countries bordering the Red Sea. Whilst Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance brought economic bounties to these countries, the majority of the countries along the Red Sea have not necessarily benefited instead most have been engulfed by socio-political and economic instability.

This paper will look at the militarization of the Horn of Africa in general. It will premise that by arguing that the trade from Europe passing through the Red Sea from the Mediterranean, amongst other things, has made the coastline along the Horn of Africa significant in global business and politics. It will specifically interrogate the establishment of the Chinese base in Djibouti, the first of its kind by China outside its borders. China has argued that the main reason for her new military base in Djibouti is to assist in peace keeping which could add into political stability in Africa and to Djibouti’s socio-economic development. In a statement the Chinese government said, “China wishes to contribute to humanitarian relief, peace and stability in Africa, and to Djibouti’s socio-economic development” (1). Furthermore, this paper will argue that although China’s stated intentions and objectives in Djibouti might be noble, there are other more pressing reasons why China has become the latest superpower to establish a military base in Djibouti. First, China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI), the nation’s global investment initiative, has made large investments in Africa and beyond. Therefore, China is preparing itself to protect its investments and interests. Second, China is part of world’s powerful nations, it has therefore by default to join the frail in order to emphasise its importance and global leadership. Third, imports and exports from China to the West utilise the Suez Canal, other nations have formed alliances to protect their vessels passing the canal. China seeks to add to those security arrangements in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, albeit specifically for its own cargo.

Background to the growing importance of the Horn of Africa

The creation of the Suez Canal in Egypt in 1869 was the beginning of the rise in geopolitical importance of the Horn of Africa in contemporary history. It also led to the diversion of majority of world trade from travelling around the continent of Africa. The canal enabled a more direct route for shipping between Europe and Asia, effectively allowing for passage from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean without having circumnavigating the African continent. Today, an average of 50 ships navigate the canal daily, carrying more than 300 million tons of goods per year (2). The Suez Canal presented opportunities and economic and political misfortunes to the countries along the Red Sea particularly those on the Horn of Africa, as this paper will later explain. The Horn of Africa consists of 4 countries namely; Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia. Ethiopia has been strategic to business and politics from time in antiquity. It’s strategic location, which links the Arab World and Africa has made it a priority for those who were fleeing persecution from medieval Arabia. The Arab migration to Abyssinia, also known as the Hijra in Islamic history, occurred in the early days of Islam in which the followers of the Prophet Muhammad of Islam followers fled persecution in Arabia. They first arrived in the Aksumite Empire (todays Ethiopia), where Ashama ibn Abjar (also known as Al-Nejashi), a Christian ruler, received and allowed them to settle in Negash, a village in the region’s Tigray Region (3).

Somalia has the longest coastline in the region. The ongoing war in that country has led to the coast of Somalia to be regarded as one of the most dangerous coastlines for maritime business in the world. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) considers the Somali coast to be the most dangerous stretch of water in the world. At any given time pirates are holding at least a dozen ships hostage including the occasional oil supertanker for which they can demand up to $25 million in ransom (4). The instability in Somalia has created an unsafe environment for business throughout the Horn of Africa especially in the Bab el Mandeb. According to the annual State of Piracy report released by One Earth Future’s Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP), the incidences of piracy took a dramatic increase in 2007 (5). This has led to the escalation of militarization of the Indian Ocean along the Horn of Africa, particularly along the Gulf of Aden, Bab el Mandeb and the coast of Somalia. Furthermore continuing war in Yemen has been another main contributor to the militarization of the Horn of Africa. Dozens of cargo ships were hijacked in these waters; this led to great disturbance of the trade. BBC reports, Somali pirates seized a record 1,181 hostages in 2010 and were paid many millions of dollars in ransom. In the fall of 2011, more than 300 hundred people were being held hostage by various pirate groups based in Somalia (6). The hijackings are commonplace to an extent that they prompted a production of a Hollywood movie called Captain Philips starring famous actor Tom Hanks. The movie depicted the dangers posed by piracy in the Horn. The impact on business along the coast of the Horn in particular, prompted countries like Ethiopia to get involved in the creation of the stabilizing force in the region. Ethiopia and Kenya sent troops to Somalia the first time in 2006. The Ethiopian troops were initially part of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Eritrea has also seen an increase military bases investments. The Saudi led coalition, which is battling the Houthi rebels in Yemen, has made substantial investments in that country in military bases. According to the United Nations monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia, the UAE has used its Eritrean base to train and equip 4000 Yemeni fighters-specifically Hadrami Elite Forces and Security Belt, who have been implicated in enforced disappearances and detainee abuse. Djibouti on the hand has been relatively peaceful comparatively in the Horn of Africa. Its geographical positioning and relative political stability has enabled the country to attract large investments, as this paper will later discuss. Moreover, Djibouti has been key in Ethiopia’s economy. Although Ethiopia possesses great political power in the region, Ethiopia is landlocked and depends on Djibouti for most of its imports and exports.

China enters an already crowded space in the Horn of Africa

China’s military base enters an already crowded space; United States (US), Japan, Italy, France and Spain have military bases in Djibouti. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti. It has cost around US$590 million to construct the base. The facility is expected to significantly increase China’s power capabilities in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. The base is 0.5 square kilometres in size and staffed by approximately 400 personnel.

China join the US Camp Lemonnier, a Naval Expeditionary Base in Djibouti. Lamonnier is situated next to Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport in Djibouti City. It is also home to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) of the US-Africa Command (USAFRICOM). It is the only permanent US Military Base in Africa. In 2013, the US presented plans to expand the base and its special forces to more than 1,000. The project is estimated to cost US$ 1.4 billion. In May 2014, the US and Djibouti agreed to extent the American lease for additional 20 years at a price of US$63 million a year in rent, it is double what the US was paying before.

Japan also has a base in Djibouti, it was established in 2009 when the country joined members of the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in response to piracy off the coast of Somalia. Japan’s base in Djibouti has 180 troops deployed in that country with a four months rotational basis. Japan spends around US$ 4.7 million on a command headquarters, boarding facilities and parking apron in Djibouti.

France and Djibouti concluded a defense cooperation treaty in December 2011 and it entered into force on 1 May 2014. The treaty sets out the operational facilities granted to French forces stationed in the country. Since independence the number of French Forces in Djibouti (FFDJ) has declined from 4300 in 1978, to 2400 in the 2000s, to the current level of 1450 — the minimum stipulated in the 2011 treaty. The FFDJ is tasked with the defence of Djibouti territory and airspace in accordance with the defence cooperation treaty, supporting the work of European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in the Horn of Africa region, and the protection of maritime vessels. The French base hosts Spanish and German detachments and the logistical support staff involved in the EU’s anti-piracy mission, EU Naval Force Atlanta (EUNAVFOR, Operation Atalanta) (7).

Italy’s National Support Military Base (Base Militare Nazionale di Supporto), located next to Djibouti — Ambouli International Airport, opened in 2013. The base is intended primarily to support Italian naval activity in the region, most notably Operation Atalanta, and the operation of UAVs. The base is reportedly capable of hosting up to 300 troops but operates with on average 80 personnel. The annual cost of the lease on the base is reported to be $2.6 million (8). Spain is involved in the EU’s Operation Atalanta and maintains around 50 personnel to support the mission, based at the French facilities in Djibouti.101 Since 2008, Spain has also continuously deployed maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (P-3C) to support Operation Atalanta. (9)

Towards understanding the reasons for China military base in Djibouti

Indeed the region has been militarizing long before the advent of Saudi led Coalition in Yemen. Saudi Arabia has been fighting the Houthis in yemen since 2015 as already stated. Analysts say Djibouti’s geostrategic location and its stability in a volatile region have made it an important playground for world powers (10). According to the TRT World analysis, “Djibouti has become an important parking space” for these countries. The geostrategic positioning of Djibouti has made it the most sorted space after Bab el-Mandeb strait on the Red Sea. Bab el Mandeb is only about 32 kilometers (20 miles) wide between Djibouti and Yemen, it also boarders the Gulf of Eden. Gulf of Eden sits amidst Yemen to the North, the Arabian Sea to the East, Somalia to the South and Djibouti to the West. The Gulf of Aden overlook one of the most important maritime chokepoints in the world, 12.5 to 20 percent of global trade passes every year. Djibouti serves as a key refueling and transshipment centre for most world business. It also serves as a key port for the imports into Ethiopia and exports to the rest of the world form that country as earlier stated. It has become a burgeoning commercial hub and a site for various military bases including the US won Camp Lemonnier and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IDAD) which has its headquarters in the country.

The Chinese military facility, which was built for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), is reported to have exclusive use of at least one of the port’s berths. The proximity between port and base reflects the integration of Chinese commercial and military interests as part of a strategy to project power abroad, even while Beijing maintains the guise of noninterference (11). Moreover, there are speculations that China decided on the military base in Djibouti to join the “big club”, after all most world superpowers have military basis in Djibouti. Moreover, China needs a half way destination from where it could replenish reserves as it continues to increase its export business along the Red Sea and as it embarks on an ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Second and importantly China needs the base in order to establish security for its investments and business interests, Djibouti is well located.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The BRI is a global development strategy adopted by China aimed at infrastructural development and investments in 152 countries and in international organizations in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas. One Belt One Road (OBOR) became BRI after Chinese government changed the name in 2016. The reason according to the Chinese the word “One” could have been misconstrued by it partners as aiming at dominating the world. China has made one of its biggest investments in Djibouti. The Doraleh Multi Purpose Port is an extension of the port of Djibouti located 5 km west of Djibouti City. The multipurpose port has terminals for handling oil, bulk cargo, and containers. It was partially owned and operated by Dubai Ports World and China Merchant Holdings until February 2018. The military base and its proximity to this investment will help protect the investment. There are a number of possible hiccups that can occur as China engage on BRI. How will China react in cases of default by countries where it has made substantial investments particularly in Africa? Furthermore how will China react in terms of security threat directed at its business? Naturally in all those instances, China will have to react; it is likely that reaction could necessitate use of force. Geostrategic location of Djibouti is key to future control of global business of China as it embarks on BRI.

Second, China has embraced a relatively non-confrontational foreign policy for most of the 21st century. At the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where it occupies a permanent seat, it has mostly abstained and/or vetoed some decisions when it comes to sensitive global political decisions. China has only employed its veto privileges 12 times the lowest number of any P5 member. As a point of comparison, the US has vetoed 80 resolutions since November 1971 — when China joined the UN — accounting for nearly two-thirds of all UNSC vetoes during this period. China has casted 11 of its 12 vetoes since 1997, demonstrating its growing activity within the UNSC (12). Many have criticized China’s position when it comes to its global responsibilities; they have accused China of renegation from its global responsibilities in order to discourage scrutiny from human rights violations. Moreover, after decades of opposition to UN peacekeeping operations, China is now a world leader in peacekeeping operations. The behavior corresponds with Beijing’s efforts to enhance China’s international image through increased participation in global governance. In 1990, China had only five soldiers deployed in peacekeeping operations. This number surged to a high of 3,084 personnel by mid-2015 and remains at over 2,500 personnel today — the most of any P5 member (13). Third, China is Africa’s biggest trade partner and is helping to develop the continent’s infrastructure (14). Although China has emphasised that its presence in Djibouti is mainly to fulfill its global responsibility, provide peace force and assist the continent in its relief efforts. There are many in Africa who view the establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti differently. They argue that China is readying itself to intervene in case its interests get threatened in the continent and beyond.

Conclusion

Djibouti’s strategic geopolitical positioning has helped the country to generate much-needed Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), at least for now. There are many opportunities that investments have brought to the economy of Djibouti. However there has been increased political impunity, proliferation of human rights abuses and undemocratic practices in Djibouti. Violations of human rights in Djibouti are an alarming concern within its borders and abroad. They have escalated to the point of surrounding nations determining whether or not Djibouti’s government has committed crimes against humanity (17). Moreover Djibouti could find itself in a coalition course with many countries in Africa. If China decides to launch attacks or use force from its base in Djibouti against any African country, it could raise tensions between the African countries and AU on one side and Djibouti. Understandably, China is not expected to invest large sums of money in Africa without putting in place certain safety nets and precautions to protects its investments. The question is how will China’s actions impact on Djibouti’s relations with its neighbours and the AU?

Finally, Djibouti has found a creative way of monetizing its strategic geographical positioning; it has allowed large parts of its coastline to become a “parking space” for global powers and their military hardware. The multinational presence of military bases in Djibouti has made the country one of the most secured country in Africa. However the manner in which Africa deals with Djibouti henceforth will largely depend on how China utilizes its bases in Djibouti. The militarization of Djibouti will certainly change the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and Africa. Ethiopia has been for longest of time been the regional powerhouse, the situation rapidly changing. Finally, China’s vast investments overseas have necessitated review of its security arrangement. The choice of Djibouti as the first country to host its military base overseas has to do with Djibouti’s strategic location.

References

1. Elizabeth C. Economy, Council on Foreign Relatios, China’s Strategy in Djibouti: Mixing commercial and military interest, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-strategy-djibouti-mixing-commercial-and-military-interests, 30 October 2019
2.  History, Suez Canal, https://www.history.com/topics/africa/suez-canal , 30 October 2019
3. Thembisa Fakude, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Understanding the foreign policy of Ethiopia towards the Gulf, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2017/12/understanding-foreign-policy-ethiopia-gulf-countries-171231100904587.html , 30 October 2019
4.  Anouk Ziljma, Tripsavvy, A guide to Somalia’s modern day pirates, https://www.tripsavvy.com/guide-to-somali-pirates-1454065 , 30 October 2019
5.  Abdi Latif Dahir, Quartz Africa, Piracy made a story comeback in Somalia, https://qz.com/africa/1287522/somali-piracy-and-armed-robbery-off-the-indian-ocean-doubled-in-2017/ 30 October 2019
6.  Ibid, https://www.tripsavvy.com/guide-to-somali-pirates-1454065, 30 October 2019
7.  Neil Melvin, The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa region, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipribp1904.pdf , 05 November 2019
8.  Ibid, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipribp1904.pdf
9.  Ibid, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipribp1904.pdf
10. Abdi Latif Dahir, Quartz Africa, How a tiny African country became the world’s key military base, https://qz.com/africa/1056257/how-a-tiny-african-country-became-the-worlds-key-military-base/ , 30 0ctober 2019
11.  Elizabeth C. Economy, Council on Foreign Relations, China’s Strategy in Djibouti: Mixing commercial and Military interest, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-strategy-djibouti-mixing-commercial-and-military-interests, 30 October 2019
12.  China Power, CSIS, Is China contributing to the United Nations’ mission?, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-un-mission/, 05 November 2019
13.  Ibid, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-un-mission/,
14. Steve Kuo, Business Day China is investing in Africa and that’s a good thing, https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-12-19-china-is-investing-in-africa-and-thats-a-good-thing/ , 30 October 2019
15.  Borgen Magazine, Government Corruption violates Human Rights in Djibouti, https://www.borgenmagazine.com/corruption-violates-human-rights-in-djibouti/ 30 October 2019.

 

Thembisa Fakude | Senior Researcher and Director Afrasid

Thembisa holds Masters degree in Politics. He is a columnist with the Middle East Monitor in London. He is a research fellow at Al Sharq Forum in Istanbul, Turkey. He serves on the board of Common Action Forum in Madrid, Spain and on the board of Mail and Guardian publication in South Africa. He is the former Bureau Chief of Al Jazeera Media Network for Arabic and English Channels in Southern Africa

 

 

Introduction 

The conflict currently raging in Tigray region of Ethiopia is rooted in the historical role of the “Deep State” consisting mainly of the members of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). What is Deep State? The expression is actually a translation of the Turkish phrase derin devlet. As historian Ryan Gingeras has explained, it arose as a way of describing “a kind of shadow or parallel system of government in which unofficial or publicly unacknowledged individuals play important roles in defining and implementing state policy.” (1). According to the Ethiopian government, the war which led to an all out offensive on Nov. 4 was in response to an attack early that morning by the TPLF controlled security forces on a military base in Tigray. As fighting erupted, Tigray officials declared that soldiers from the Northern Command of the Ethiopian military had defected and sided with them. Mr. Abiy bolstered his forces by deploying militia fighters from Amhara, a region south of Tigray, who swept into western Tigray amid accusations of attacks on civilians (2). Tensions began in earnest after the national government ordered the postponement of federal elections which were suppose to be held in Tigray region in November 2020. The national government of Ethiopia instructed the postponement of the elections due to COVID-19 pandemic. The government led by the TPLF ignored the instructions and went ahead with the electoral process in defiance. The outcome of the elections were not recognised by the national government. Since, thousands of civilians have been killed and millions displaced by the war. About 2.2 million people have been displaced within Ethiopia’s Tigray region since fighting erupted there in November with about half fleeing after their homes were burned down, a local government official in Tigray said (3).

When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed assumed office on 02 April 2018, there was a sense of optimism that there was going to be development in general in Ethiopia. The release of jailed journalists and improvement in media laws added to that optimism. Ethiopia has long had a reputation as one of the worst jailers of journalists in the world, reportedly holding 18 reporters at one time in detention. Yet as of Dec. 1, the country was recorded as not having any imprisoned journalists. This comes after a number of political and economic reforms undertaken by the newly elected reformist leader of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front party. (4). Ahmed’s personal background is probably the most reflective of Ethiopia’s diverse society, so his election to premiership also suggested changes in Ethiopian political infrastructure. He is a son a Muslim father and Christian mother; his lineage is Oromo, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. The Oromo have been accusing government authorities of economic and political marginalisation, therefore the election of Ahmed was viewed by many Oromo as a moment of hope. Moreover, Ahmad’s acceptance and approval by most countries around the world, his popularity within Ethiopia and Africa in general brought a semblance of pride to many in Ethiopia. Young, handsome and clever, Ahmed won the Noble Peace Price in 2019 for his role in negotiating a peaceful settlement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. His ambitious plan to reconfigure regional and coordinate economic and political efforts in the Horn of Africa also won him a number of accolades. On January 27, 2020 the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia — President Isaias Afwerki, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, held their third trilateral meeting. trilateral meeting. They proposed to form a new regional bloc, which has been referred to as the Horn of Africa Cooperation. (5)

However, what perhaps raised international attention to Ahmed’s premiership was his undertaking to tackle corruption and redress the human rights record in Ethiopia. But, as it has became apparent, addressing these two main challenges has not been smooth sailing. After taking office, Ahmed instituted arrests of those accused of corruption and violations of human rights. Most of those arrested were members of the TPLF. In November 2018, at least 79 security officers, officials, businessmen and women, many of them Tigrayan, have been arrested since last week — under what the government said was a clamp-down on corruption and mistreatment of prisoners (6). Unlike in other parts of Africa where similar campaigns of fighting corruption were implemented, it was harder in Ethiopia due lack of credible democratic institutions. Consequently Ahmed has been accused of pursuing his own personal political agenda. Take South Africa for an example; “When President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa assumed office he engaged on a similar political trajectory as Ethiopia. However his work was made easy by the existence of democratic institutions in that country. South Africa has a strong independent judicial system for starters, active multiparty parliament and effective opposition. Ahmed on the other hand had to implement these changes without any of these essential structures. “It was a tall order, a main huddle from the onset” (7). Ahmed had to personally intervene in rooting out corruption, he had to fire and hire ministers and restructure politics in his government without a support of any independent structure. He called into account many members of his own coalition, many of whom were his colleagues in parliament and within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was disbanded in 2019. It consisted of four political parties, namely Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM). EPRDF led a movement which eventually overthrew the Communist People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1991.

Tigray is the last position for TPLF, a bastion of protection for its members from possible persecution by the national government for human rights crimes and corruption. Ahmed’s political intervention in fighting corruption was essential in order to achieve desired socio-political changes in Ethiopia. This paper will look at the role of the Deep State in the conflict in Tigray, how TPL’s insistence to hold on to power and entrench itself in regional politics triggered the tit for tat military actions between its forces and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) in Tigray. It will argue that Ethiopian Deep State consists by and large of members of the TPLF. It will also look at the role and impact of external actors in the conflict. The paper will conclude by putting forward scenarios that will likely occur as it has become clear that TPLF will be engaging in protracted guerilla warfare. Former president of the TPLF Debretsion Gebremichael warned, “let our enemies and friends know that until we get our victory we will not go anywhere.”

The role of the Deep State in the Tigray conflict

Abiy Ahmad had serious sociopolitical and economic challenges to address as he started embarking to tackle corruption and human rights violations in Ethiopia. He has to bring to book those accused of corruption as a matter of urgency. There was however one big huddle. Most of those accused of widespread corruption and past human rights violations are members of the TPLF, a leading party within the EPRDF coalition. TPLF is also accused of forming part of the deep state based in Tigray. The TPLF led the armed struggle to topple the brutal Derg regime in 1991 and controlled the ruling coalition that took over. But since Abiy took office, Tigrayan leaders have complained of being unfairly targeted in corruption prosecutions, removed from top positions and broadly scapegoated for the country’s woes (8). TPLF created the EPRDF in the late 1980s. The first leader of EPRDF and former Prime Minister after the revolution in Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi was from Tigray ethnic group. Although he, to an extent, managed to bring back political stability in Ethiopia, his leadership is accused of further entrenching the deep state in Tigray. Members of TPLF continued to occupy senior positions in his cabinet, the army, business and other government apparatuses. Zenawi passed away in Brussels, Belgium in August 2012. Haile Mariam Desalegn replaced Zenawi; he was a Prime Minister of Ethiopia from 2012 to 2018. Desalegn was forced to resign after sustained protests in Oromo region of Ethiopia. Given the history and influence of the TPLF inside the EPRDF, Ahmed would have struggled to achieve his objectives within the current political parametres. Therefore, he had to establish an alternative platform, the Prosperity Party (PP), to implement necessary reforms.

The Prosperity Party (PP) has done away with the four-part ethnic coalition structure which made up the EPRDF. It will instead be a single organization spanning the entire country. (9). The dissolution of EPDRF has ushered in a new form of politics in Ethiopia. It also presents new challenges for smaller parties formerly within the coalition in Ethiopia. Most of these parties were cushioned by their membership within the coalition into participation in the national politics of the country and indeed inclusion into parliament. “PP is therefore by all accounts a true national political party that will seek to move away from tribal identity politics into truly national politics in Ethiopia according to senior members in the party” (10). The party gives Abiy Ahmed a new mandate to make decisions instead of being prevented, as it were, by consensus within the EPDRF. The inner machinations inside the EPDRF will have certainly impeded certain proposed transformation particularly in addressing past injustices and corruption. The dissolution of EPDRF introduces perhaps for the first time after the revolution in Ethiopia a national organisation whose membership will be open to all irrespective of their tribal background as earlier alluded. The EPRDF had long depicted Ethiopia’s ethnic groups as victims of forced assimilationist policy — under a nation-building project that began in the 19th century and ended in 1995 with the introduction of the Ethiopia’s federal constitution, which granted the “nations, nationalities and peoples” the right to self-determination. Abiy formulated an alternative history that de-emphasized ethnic oppression and instead focused on ethnic harmony and national unity. (10). However the formation of PP presents another challenge for Ahmed. Past politicking in Ethiopia created a culture of tribal patronage e.g. most Oromo thought their time had arrived to benefit when Ahmed was elected to office. The formation of PP dashes those ambitions for other ethnic groups as he prioritizes the sociopolitical urgencies of all Ethiopians.

The Deep State in Tigray has been enabled by a number of factors including TPLF’s historical role in the politics of Ethiopia. These factors have influenced a level of entitlement in terms of national leadership and played a role in militarization of Tigray. Moreover, when Eritrea gained independence, Tigray became a new buffer between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Fast — forward to the time when the boarder dispute between the two countries ensued, it was TPLF in Tigray which held the frontier. The defiance by TPLF to go ahead with elections notwithstanding the disapproval by the national government was not a coincidence; it was a political reminder to the national government of the role and significance of TPLF in Ethiopian politics. It was also an attempt meant to further entrench and protect their political positioning in Tigray. Importantly, it was an act meant to avert and shield TPLF members from persecution from alleged corruption and violations of human rights. The TPLF was hoping to have elections, which would have further entrenched itself in the region and build up strong politics and military which would have helped protect its interests, importantly build an independent state. (11).

The role of external actors in the conflict in Tigray

The conflict in Tigray is likely to attract opportunistic external forces aiming at exploiting the current standoff between the TPLF and the national government. Sudan has been foremost affected by the conflict in Tigray. Sudan currently hosts a number of displaced people from Tigray, the humanitarian strife has deteriorated inside the country. There are 61,209 refugees registered (14 February, UNHCR) · 35,123 refugees relocated from Hamdayet and Abdrafi and Village 8 to Um Raquba (20,572 people) and Tunaydbah (14,551 people) refugee camps· $157 million needed to respond to the urgent needs of up to 115,000 refugees and 22,000 host communities in Sudan and Djibouti up to June 2021. So far, $40 million has been pledged (12). There are also suspicions that TPLF could use Sudan as a springboard to wage its guerrilla warfare against Ethiopia. War could be profitable; in Sudan there are many who stand to benefit from the war in Ethiopia, particularly the army. Sudan’s military has close ties with the TPLF, including Burhan, stemming from their past experiences during Bashir’s regime. Many Sudanese generals, developed close ties with TPLF during this period. (13). Furthermore, conflict in Tigray has also triggered a long standing boarder dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan which is seen as a smokescreen to hide the presence of TPLF’s bases inside Sudan. Tensions recently reached a boiling point after Sudan accused Ethiopian aircraft of crossing its boarder. On 31 January 2021, Ethiopian forces stationed in the Abdel-Rafi area fired mortar shells towards a Sudanese reconnaissance force crossing the Abu Teyyour Mountains, according to news reports. No casualties were reported. Ethiopian authorities have called for dialogue on condition that Sudanese forces leave the disputed border region. Senior leaders in the Sudanese army, however, have stressed that Sudan will not back down from land that, according to them, constitutes sovereign territory (14). Having said that, although guerrilla warfare is perhaps the next logical plan of action by the TPLF, Sudan itself is battling a number of internal conflicts it might be circumspect in allowing the TPLF to use its territory for a protracted warfare against Ethiopia.

Second, Tigray region shares its entire northern boarder with Eritrea. It is perhaps its geographical location that has made the region of Tigray important to Ethiopia. During political tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 1990’s, Tigray was a buffer zone between the Ethiopian hinterland and Eritrean frontlines. This has therefore meant that although relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia might have altered after peace agreement between the two countries; people in the boarder areas still had to nurse certain tensions after years of conflict. TPLF and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) had a long history of coordination, fighting the centralized government of Ethiopia. The renegation of coordination by the EPLF after 1991 when Eritrea’s independence was recognised, dashed TPLF’s ambitions of pursuing their own state and independence. TPLF continued, albeit not overtly, to resent Eritrea and arguably still hold a grudge against EPLF. The subsequent peace agreement between Isaias Afwerki and Abiy Ahmed further incensed TPLF’s deep state. It was therefore not a surprise when it was announced that Eritrea has decided to enter the conflict and take sides earlier in the conflict. In a recent address to the Ethiopian parliament, the Nobel laureate revealed that Eritrea, a highly militarised one-party state, had fed, clothed and armed retreating Ethiopian soldiers when the TPLF first attacked them and seized their bases in Tigray, an Ethiopian region which borders Eritrea (15)

Third, UAE operates Chinese produced drones program stationed in the in the Eritrean port city of Assab. This has been confirmed by Wim Zwijnenburg, a humanitarian disarmament project leader for PAX, an organization that studies global conflict and researches the use of military technologies, he has been analyzing satellite imagery collected by the U.S. company Planet Lab. According to Wim, the 20-meter wingspan, Chinese-made drones known as the Wing Loong II are capable of dropping bombs or shooting missiles. Forces in Ethiopia’s Tigray region have accused the federal government of partnering with the United Arab Emirates to use weaponized drones stationed in Eritrea (16). Besides needing spaces to tests its military muscle and new technology, the UAE is involved in a number of conflicts in Yemen, Libya, Eritrea and Djibouti amongst others (17). UAE and Saudi Arabia run military bases in Djibouti and Eritrea which have been used as launching positions against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. If allegations by TPLF are correct, there is certainly going to be a further militarization of the region.

Conclusion

The conflict in Tigray was long time coming; it was a matter of time before it became an all out war. The regrouping of the Deep State in Tigray started when Ahmed resumed office. Unfortunately the absence of democratic institutions to deal with violation of human rights and corruption in Ethiopia led to Abiy Ahmed using his political power to intervene. He moved swiftly to arrest those accused of graft and human rights violations. These efforts sent a strong message that he was dedicated to transformation; it also earned him respect from across the world. The defiance by TPLF not to postpone elections, was largely criticized by many in the region and indeed inside Ethiopia. Moreover, the insistence to hold elections was not only meant to undermine the national government by the TPLF; it was also meant to take advantage of the state of unpreparedness. TPLF wanted to win elections and then entrench itself in the region. This would have allowed it to call for independence something that could have encouraged similar actions in other regions of Ethiopia, it is something Ethiopia couldn’t have afforded. The continuing hostilities in Tigray could further plunge Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa into further chaos. There are a number of scenarios that could compromise Ethiopia’s strategic positioning if the current situation in Tigray and with TPLF is allowed to deteriorate any further:

First, the geographical positioning of Ethiopia in the politics of the Horn of Africa has made the country a key player in the region and indeed the Red Sea. Al Shabbab and Somali criminals have continued to create a disturbance to business in the Red Sea. Although Ethiopia does not share the coastline of the Red Sea, stable Ethiopia is key to business in those waters, it has the most reliable force in the region and can be called upon whenever necessary to monitor and police the Red Sea. However the conflict in Tigray could add a serious challenge to efforts seeking to improve safety and security in the Red Sea. It is not farfetched that the ousted TPLF could join forces with Al Shabbab and other criminal elements in the coast of Somalia to further destabilise business along the Red Sea. Furthermore, Ethiopian troops have been part of the AU peacekeeping initiative in Somalia African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM has also been key in assisting Somalia National Security Forces in pushing back the advances of Al Shabbab. Therefore, it is not unimaginable that Al Shabbab could find a new alliance in TPLF. Al Shabbab can use that alliance to wage a war and settle old scores against Ethiopia. Second, whilst the advent of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is likely to change the fortunes of Ethiopia as it could enable the country to become energy self reliant, it has also created hostilities for Ethiopia. Sudan and Egypt are opposed to GERD, they claim that it will impact the flow of water into the Nile which their people and economies heavily rely. TPFL could try and exploit this situation by working with these hostile forces to further destabilise Ethiopia. Third, the presence of countries like US, China, some Europeans and Gulf countries in the Horn of Africa has impacted the political fortunes and relevance of Ethiopia. Ethiopia is playing an important role in providing security in the region. Ethiopia is a key ally of the Western world, especially the U.S., which considers it as an important regional security partner in the global war on terror. (18). Moreover, the presence of the headquarters of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa has certainly alleviated the political and strategic positioning of Ethiopia. Multitudes of African diplomats and general workers are currently residing in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a key prize in the scramble for influence and power in the Horn of Africa and broader Red Sea region. With its natural resources, population of 110 million, and well-equipped military, Ethiopia has become an African power. (19). TPLF could engage in terrorism inside the country, this could seriously impact Ethiopia’s strategic position safety and security and reputation. Finally, Ethiopia is probably the most suitable country to coordinate a number of regional functions including supporting tourism infrastructure and regional security. TPLF could disrupt those intentions for all countries in the region. It is therefore in the interest of all countries in the region to press for a peaceful Ethiopia and resist advances to align with TPLF.

In conclusion, besides the pressing political challenges in Tigray, Ahmed has to still address the national economic challenges facing the country. Failure to address these immediate challenges could broaden the anti-government coalition, which could legitimize TPLF and present it as a victim. After all, protests that led to his election into power were as a result of certain promises of economic redress. Almost three years since he became Prime Minister, the economic situation has not made progress and has failed to meet the demands of those who protested for economic changes and inclusion. Ethiopia’s real GDP growth slowed to an estimated 7.4% in 2019 from 7.7% in 2018, caused by social unrest and fiscal consolidation to stabilize the public debt. (20). Lastly, the formation of PP ushered in a new form of political engagement in Ethiopia and also disabled TPLF to call for independence in order to shield itself from persecution. The conflict in Tigray demonstrates the trappings of decades of tribal based politics and the rise of a deep state who sole purpose was to serve narrow political interests.

References

1. Rebecca Gordon, Insider, What the American deep state’ actually is, and why Trump gets it wrong, https://www.businessinsider.com/what-deep-state-is-and-why-trump-gets-it-wrong-2020-1?IR=T , 20 Feb 2021
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17. 17. Robert Klosowicz, Researchgate, The role of Ethiopia in the regional security complex in the Horn of Africa, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341830607_The_role_of_Ethiopia_in_the_regional_security_complex_of_the_Horn_of_Africa, 20 Feb. 2021
18. 18. Abdi Latif Dahir, Quartz Africa, For the first time in decades, there are no Ethiopian journalists in prisons, https://qz.com/africa/1494561/ethiopia-has-no-jailed-journalists-in-2018-the-first-since-2004/ , 20 Feb 2021
19. 19. Michael Horton, The Jamestown Foundation, How war in Ethioipia impacts Red Sea and Horn of Africa power politics: The battle in Tigray and beyond, https://jamestown.org/program/how-war-in-ethiopia-impacts-red-sea-and-horn-of-africa-power-politics-the-battle-in-tigray-and-beyond/#:~:text=Ethiopia%20is%20a%20key%20prize,and%20broader%20Red%20Sea%20region.&text=All%20four%20of%20those%20countries,especially%20its%20important%20agricultural%20sector, 20 Feb. 2021.
20. 20. AFDB, Ethiopia Economic outlook, https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-economic-outlook, 20 Feb 2021 (10)